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Max Velmans (born 27 May 1942) is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at Goldsmiths, University of London. He co-founded the Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Society in 1994, and served as its chair from 2003 to 2006. He was appointed National Visiting Professor for 2010–2011 by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, and in 2011 was elected to the British Academy of Social Sciences.〔()〕 Velmans has around 100 publications in the area of consciousness studies, including ''Understanding Consciousness'' (2000). In his map of prominent theories of consciousness Francisco Varela categorises Velmans' work as non-reductionist, stressing the importance of first-person accounts of the phenomenology of consciousness,〔Varela, F. J. (1999) Present time consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(2–3), 111–140.〕 as well as third-person accounts of brain states and functions, which in Velmans' work are thought of as complementary.〔biem Graben, P. & Atmanspacher, H. (2009) Extending the philosophical significance of the idea of complementarity. In H. Atmanspacher and H. Primas (eds.) Recasting reality: Wolfgang Pauli’s Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science. Springer, pp.99–113. *Hoche, Hans-Ulrich (2007) Reflexive monism versus complementarism: An analysis and criticism of the conceptual groundwork of Max Velmans's reflexive model of consciousness Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6 (3) , pp. 389–409.〕 Velmans is principally known for the theory of consciousness called "reflexive monism," in which the materialist/dualist gap is bridged by placing aspects of human consciousness in the experienced world, rather than within the brain; the theory also combines facets of realism with facets of idealism, though it falls short of avowing the necessity of perception to the existence of reality ''per se'' (the principle of "esse est percipi").〔Blackmore, S. (2003) Consciousness: An introduction. Hodder & Stoughton. *Blackmore, S. (2005) Conversations on Consciousness: Interviews with wenty minds. Oxford University Press. *Revonsuo, A. (2006) Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon. Cambridge: MIT Press.〕 ==Understanding Consciousness== Velmans' ''Understanding Consciousness'' (2000) is a comprehensive summary of his theoretical work, and introduces the idea of "reflexive monism."〔Harris, K. (2009) Review of Max Velmans Understanding Consciousness. Metapsychology, 13 (52) http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=5300&cn=396 *Faw, B. (2009) Book review of Max Velmans, Understanding Consciousness (2nd ed.) Journal of Consciousness Studies. Vol. 16, No.9, pp103-108 http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/16-9_br.pdf *Zeman, A. (2001) The paradox of consciousness: a review of Understanding Consciousness (2000) by Max Velmans. The Lancet Vol. 357, Issue 9249, p77. http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(05)71582-8/fulltext *Batthyany, A (2002) Consciousness in the natural world (a review of M.Velmans, 2000, Understanding Consciousness). Theory & Psychology 12(3), pp. 415–417. http://www.psych.ucalgary.ca/thpsyc/Reviews12(3).pdf〕 Reflexive monism presents itself as an alternative to both dualism and reductionism. It states that it does not make sense to speak of phenomenological experiences of reality as occurring ''within'' the brain, given that some of them quite clearly occur within the experienced world itself (that is, asked to point to the light they experience, almost all rational subjects would point to the light that is experienced rather than to the brain, which is where, according to dualists and reductionists, the experience ''actually takes place''). Thus, Velmans argues, the relationship between subjects and experienced reality is reflexive: some experiences apprehended by the subject are quite clearly placed "in the world" by the perceiving mind. The contents of consciousness are, thus, not exclusively in the brain, but often in the perceived physical world itself; in fact, in terms of phenomenology, there is no clear and distinct difference between what we normally think of as the "physical world", the "phenomenal world" and the "world as perceived".〔Velmans, M. (2009) Understanding Consciousness, Edition 2. Routledge/Psychology Press, p. 298 *Harris, K. (2009) Review of Max Velmans Understanding Consciousness. Metapsychology, 13 (52) http://metapsychology.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=book&id=5300&cn=396〕 He writes: This sketch of how consciousness fits into the wider universe supports a form of non-reductive, Reflexive Monism. Human minds, bodies and brains are embedded in a far greater universe. Individual conscious representations are perspectival. That is, the precise manner in which entities, events and processes are translated into experiences depends on the location in space and time of a given observer, and the exact mix of perceptual, cognitive, affective, social, cultural and historical influences which enter into the 'construction' of a given experience. In this sense, each conscious construction is private, subjective, and unique. Taken together, the contents of consciousness provide a ''view'' of the wider universe, giving it the appearance of a 3D phenomenal world. ... However, such conscious representations are not the thing-itself. In this vision, there is one universe (the thing-itself), with relatively differentiated parts in the form of conscious beings like ourselves, each with a unique, conscious view of the larger universe of which it is a part. In so far as we are parts of the universe that, in turn, experience the larger universe, we participate in a reflexive process whereby the universe experiences itself."〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Max Velmans」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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